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Abstract — The threat of traffic analysis attacks against the 
Tor System is an acknowledged and open research issue, 
especially in critical infrastructures, motivating the need for 
continuous research into the potential attacks and 
countermeasures against this threat. This paper aims to provide 
an in-depth study into the driving technical mechanisms of the 
current state-of-art Tor System (Browser Bundle and Network) 
that aim to provide its benefits to anonymity and privacy online. 
This work presents the countermeasures that have been proposed 
and/or implemented against such attacks, in a collated evaluation 
to determine their effectiveness, suitability to Tor Project, and its 
design aims/goals.  
Keywords — anonymity, privacy, tor, traffic analysis, critical 
infrastructures.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE Tor system is one of the most popular low-latency 
mix-based anonymity systems in use today. In 2012 the 
network consisted of just over 3000 relays and about 1000 
bridges, today the network has more than doubled in size in 
terms of the volunteer run overlay network, now consisting of 
over 7000 relays and over 3000 bridges [1]. The system itself 
consists of a browser bundle, allowing a variety of users to 
browse the internet and Tor hidden services via the second 
component, the volunteer run overlay network, used to 
provide the benefits of anonymity and privacy for user’s 
utilizing the network, and also for the administrators/owners 
of the hidden services. 
A. Research Problem 
 The Tor system provides benefits to user and administrator 
with anonymity and privacy online, however, it does not claim 
to provide perfect protection. This was outlined in the original 
design paper [2], explaining that the system was developed 
with the intention of balancing anonymity, usability, and 
efficiency. The threat model outlined within this paper 
specifies that the system aims to protect against attacks from a 
non-global adversary (with the ability to control or observe a 
fraction of the network and its users). Despite the limited 
threat model, a variety of low-resource traffic analysis attacks 
have been outlined over its lifetime that fit within this threat 
model, such as the work of Murdoch & Danezi [3] and Bauer 
et al. [4]. The traffic analysis issue is acknowledged by 
developers as an open-research issue, with particular focus on 
traffic correlation and webpage fingerprinting attacks (WPF) 
[5], as previously outlined the issue has been proven across a 
variety of papers, illustrating that such attacks are possible 
within the constraints of the specified adversary threat model. 
Although much research has been made in this area, yet 
appears to lack a collated/collective evaluation of the 
countermeasures against such traffic analysis attacks, up to a 
more current date (May, 2017).  
B. Contribution 
We aim to outline some of the gaps and shortcomings within 
the current researched and implemented countermeasures 
against these attacks, with the intention of opening routes of 
research in this area. Additionally, we identified the 
countermeasures by a critical analysis that show potential for 
use within the Tor system, in terms of effectiveness and 
overall suitability to the original design goals.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II 
overviews background study, and Section III outlines the 
requirements and design goals of the system used to evaluate 
the suitability of the proposed countermeasures. Section IV 
consists of research findings overviewing the 
countermeasures, their individual attributes and actual 
functionality in order to provide protection. Section V follows 
with the analysis and evaluation of the countermeasures and 
Section VI concludes this work. 
II. BACKGROUND STUDY 
This section contains an overview of the vulnerable areas 
identified, through the study of the various traffic analysis 
attacks that have been researched, performed and simulated 
against the system lifetime. 
A. Entry Relay (Guard) Selection & Rotation Algorithm 
The most common area that facilitated the attacks 
researched was the relay selection algorithm. Almost all the 
attacks covered rely on the adversary being able to control 
and/or observe the entry relay (and entry point to the 
network). This position was later renamed and re-engineered 
as the entry guard relay (as of version 0.1.1.20) [4]. This 
position is focused upon mainly due to the fact that it is 
generally the closest relay to either the targeted client, and 
thus is the only relay that knows the IP address of the target. 
T 
Prior to and after the initial introduction of entry guards, the 
first relay was selected based upon bandwidth ratings and 
uptime on the network [2] (represented primarily using the 
“fast” and “stable” relay flags). Later selection was based 
upon whether a relay held the “guard” flag (determining the 
relay is suitable for use as an entry guard) [7]. The main issue 
with this selection mechanism is that initially resource costs 
were low to run and become an entry relay, even after the 
introduction of entry guards. Various attacks have reduced the 
resource requirements of gaining the position by reporting 
bandwidth and uptime information falsely in order to 
influence the algorithm, and thus increasing the probability of 
gaining this position [4], [8]. Øverlier & Syverson [8] revealed 
further issues with the entry relay selection process when 
performing attacks upon hidden services, since the attacker 
can induce circuit creation, allowing the attacker to force re-
selection of relays to attempt to gain the position through 
probability alone. 
B. Preserved Inter-Cell/Packet Transmission Timings 
The design goals of balancing anonymity and usability, 
accompanied by a lack of batching strategies result in the 
retention of timing characteristics during the transmission of 
packets/cells across the network [3], [14]. These timing 
characteristics are the main factor facilitating all of the studied 
traffic correlation attacks (also referred to as timing-
correlation attacks), the passive timing attacks studied utilised 
the natural timing characteristics in the targeted client traffic 
flows. An example of this is the attack presented by Bauer et 
al. [4] that exploited the natural timing pattern created upon 
circuit creation in order to de-anonymise newly created 
circuits.  
Active attacks, however inject patterns (often referred to as 
active-watermarking) into a client’s traffic in order to perform 
their correlation, the attack presented by Ling et al. [9] 
injected patterns via a controlled exit relay and correlated the 
patterns at the entry guard relay. Similar watermarking 
techniques were administered in the attack presented by 
Chakravarty et al. [14], however, the injection occurred by 
utilising a compromised web server, aiming to de-anonymize 
users accessing the compromised server. Additionally, the 
WPF attack presented by Panchenko et al. [11] utilises these 
timing characteristics in order to develop vectors/patterns, 
created based on the natural packet timings when loading a 
particular webpage or set of pages, and compared against a 
vector on target client’s traffic. 
C. Packet/Cell Order, Amount, Interval, Size and Direction 
The main basis of WPF attacks is to create vectors or 
fingerprints based upon distinguishable traffic characteristics, 
such as packet/cell transmission timings. 
The attack presented by Shi and Matsuura [10] focusses on 
what the author referred to as an “interval” in order to develop 
its vectors. The interval was said to be a recording of the 
number of inbound packets transmitted to the target client, 
each interval is separated by an outbound packet/flow. 
Panchenko et al. [11] created vectors based upon both inbound 
and outbound packets, recording the size of each packet, the 
direction of flow, the timings at which they are transmitted, as 
well as the observed packet sequence and total amount of 
packets transmitted. Cai et al. [12] extends the work of 
Panchenko et al. [11]. Their attack differs by developing their 
vectors based upon the observed sequence (including amount) 
and the observed direction of transmitted packets. The 
accuracy is improved with new techniques for vector 
production, to include website based vectors, as well as hot 
(cached page load) and cold (un-cached page load) vectors. 
Additionally, the authors simulate their attack, and the 
previously outlined attack by Panchenko et al. [11] with the 
addition of the newly implemented HTTPOS randomisation 
and pipelining countermeasure, claiming both attacks resist 
the countermeasure to a high degree. Wang & Goldberg [13] 
present further improvements to WPF attack accuracy by 
developing its vectors/fingerprints after extracting the fixed-
size Tor cells from the TCP packets transmitted, instead 
recording the amount and direction of the extracted cells. In 
addition, new string-based vector and comparison algorithms 
are employed to perform the fingerprinting, offering further 
accuracy improvements and reduced resource costs. 
III. MODELLING REQUIREMENTS 
In order to evaluate the countermeasures, we determine the 
grounds at which they should be evaluated. A set of goals was 
developed based on the original goals of the Tor system, and 
the defined threat model. These are explained and elaborated 
below.  
A. System Model/Goals 
The original Tor design paper states that the main aim of the 
system is to frustrate attackers that are attempting to link 
communication partners (e.g., traffic from user to server/ 
hidden service, or instant messaging partners) or attempting to 
link multiple communications (or traffic) to a single user [2]. 
However, the paper continues to elaborate that this main aim 
has been met with the consideration of several other design 
goals, the most relevant to this research have been summarised 
below. 
Deployability: The paper states that the system must not be 
expensive to run, must not place liability on relay operators, 
and the system must not be difficult or expensive to update or 
implement. This additionally covers compatibility across 
different systems and platforms [2]. 
Usability: As a mix-based system, Tor relies upon its 
popularity to ensure the strength of the anonymity provided, it 
essentially hides traffic alongside other users’ traffic. Thus, it 
is important to ensure the system is both easily accessible and 
stress free in use, to ensure the growth and continued use of 
the system. This covers ease of installation, configuration, 
operation as well as the speed at which the service is delivered 
[2]. 
In terms of the evaluation, these design goals are useful for 
determining the actual suitability of the researched 
countermeasures.  
B. Adversary Threat Model 
The Tor Project does not claim to provide perfect anonymity 
to its users, the authors of the original design paper state that 
this is the case for all low-latency anonymity systems due to 
their inherent balance of security (anonymity & privacy), 
usability and efficiency [2]. The paper continues to specify the 
threat model the system aims to protect against, thereby 
defining the level of protection that should be provided by the 
system. The adversary is specified as a “non-global 
adversary”, this is elaborated as an adversary possessing 
limited resources, whom can observe and/or control a subset 
of the relays and clients over the network [2]. In addition, the 
adversary is said to be capable of manipulating the traffic 
passing through his/her controlled resources (clients, relays, 
routers) to potentially inject a pattern and/or modify user 
traffic.  
All of the attacks selected for this research fit within this 
limited adversary model, thus, it is of course important that the 
countermeasures provide protection against these threats. 
C. Countermeasure Security and Suitability Goals 
Each of the goals at which the countermeasures shall be 
evaluated has been listed and elaborated below. They have 
also been classified using the MoSCoW classification system 
in order to define their weightage and importance. 
1.0 (Must) Protect against traffic correlation attacks 
within the specified threat model: This goal was established 
based upon the previously outlined threat model, it is 
classified as a “must” goal as it determines the minimum level 
of protection desired. 
1.1 (Could) Prevent (all researched) traffic correlation 
attacks: This goal extends upon 1.0 to cover prevention, 
however, achieving complete prevention of this threat was still 
determined as a desirable, but perhaps unrealistic goal, and 
thus was classified as “could”. 
2.0 (Must) Protect against website/webpage 
fingerprinting attacks, within the specified threat model: 
This goal is derived from the threat model similar to goal 1.0, 
but covers WPF attacks. 
2.1 (Could) Prevent (all researched) WPF attacks: Again, 
it is desirable but perhaps unrealistic goal similar to 1.1. 
3.0 (Should) Not require prior configuration, decision 
making, or professional knowledge from the user: It is 
derived from “Deployability” design goal, system should be 
easy and inexpensive to set-up/install. However, as different 
users desire different levels of anonymity the classification of 
“should” was assigned, minor configuration may be necessary 
to set the desired level of anonymity. 
4.0 (Should) Have the ability to withstand the potential 
growth of the network: This goal was elicited based upon the 
constant growth of Tor and its users. The classification of 
“should” has been assigned due to the dynamic nature of this 
area (i.e., constant progression and growth) [1]. If a 
countermeasure relies on there being a certain amount of 
bandwidth/processing power available, or is not effective 
under high load, then this goal has not been met. 
5.0 Not impose excessive overheads: This goal has been 
based upon both the “Deployability” and “Usability” design 
goals of Tor, as well as the fact that it is intended to be a low-
latency system. A countermeasure “must” not impose 
excessive overheads to the user, system or service/relay 
operators. This can be in the form of resource costs (monetary 
and bandwidth), as well as increases in latency upon the 
service provided. 
6.0 Not require all clients to utilise the measure for the 
system to continue operating: Elicited upon the “Usability” 
and “Deployability” goals of the system, implemented 
countermeasures “must” be compatible with previous version 
of Tor to ensure that the current run relays continue to provide 
their resources to the network. A reduction in available 
resources could result in a slower service, conflicting with the 
usability design goal and coincidentally a slower service could 
result in less users, thus degrading the strength of the 
anonymity. 
IV. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This section details the basic function of each of the 
researched countermeasures that aim to provide protection 
against the outlined traffic correlation and WPF threats. 
Additionally, the current status of each countermeasure is 
detailed (i.e., currently implemented, proposed/under-
discussion in the Tor bug tracker, or suggested within relating 
research). 
A. Entry Guard Selection and Rotation Algorithm Updates 
 As previously outlined the entry relay was initially selected 
based upon uptime and bandwidth ratings alone, in order to 
raise the resource cost of becoming such a powerful relay the 
entry guard concept was introduced. Initially 3 guard relays 
were selected by clients, keeping them for a period of 4-8 
weeks before rotation, or if more than one guard becomes 
unreachable (0.1.1.11-alpha through 0.2.4.11-alpha) [15]. 
Elahi et al. [16] demonstrated that the rotation of guards 
increases the probability that a malicious relay shall be 
selected by a client, because of this the rotation period was 
increased to 2-3 months (as of 0.2.4.12) [15]. Further research 
into guard selection/rotation performed by Dingledine et al. 
[17] demonstrated that using a single guard for as long as 9 
months would greatly decrease this probability even further. 
This generated the issues with load balancing across newer 
guards, because old guards are being rotated less, new guards 
are only likely to be selected by new clients (with a slim 
chance due to the uptime weighting) [18]. A new guard 
selection algorithm was introduced to adjust how guards are 
selected, the main basis is allowing a relay to become more 
“guardy” gradually, this means a relay that is only 50% guard 
will still be used in the middle and exit relay positions in order 
to retain the use of their resources (Tor 0.2.x-final) [19]. 
B. Multipath Routing Schemes – mTorHS and Conflux 
mTorHS [21] and Conflux [22] are both multipath routing 
schemes suggested for the use in the Tor system. Both of these 
schemes feature flow splitting and merging functionalities, 
sending a single client traffic via multiple Tor circuits in order 
to both distort the flows (providing improved anonymity and 
distorting packet sequences and packet/cell timings) as well as 
balance the load across the network. 
C. HTTPOS Randomised Pipelining 
Currently implemented (as of TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-
stable) browser-based countermeasure provides its protection 
utilising traffic transformation techniques [23]. The 
countermeasure obfuscates identifiable traffic characteristics 
utilised within WPF attacks (packet count, order, size) by 
processing TCP requests whilst administering order 
randomisation [24], [12]. 
D. Improved Bandwidth Verification 
To prevent malicious relay operators from making false 
bandwidth claims and influencing the relay/path selection 
algorithm, Perry [26] introduced “bandwidth authorities” 
(bwauths). Essentially the “bwauths” actively probe relays at 
regular intervals, logging their perceived bandwidth 
capabilities and comparing them to similar level relays, and 
then adjusting the weights accordingly. This results in a 
relay’s bandwidth weight gradually increasing over time until 
it finally peaks and settles [18], [26].  
E. Padding Schemes 
 A variety of padding schemes have been identified and 
detailed below, the general purpose of each scheme is to 
obscure the timings of packet/cell transmission. 
1) Adaptive Padding (AP): The AP scheme is 
implemented and provided by the relays upon the network, 
timing patterns are reduced by this defence by inserting 
dummy packets into statistically unlikely gaps in inconsistent 
traffic flows [27]. The defence is suggested by Juarez et al. 
[28] and is also proposed as a possible WPF defence within 
the Tor bug Tracker. However, the proposal is still open to 
alternative schemes [29].  
2) Dependent Link Padding (DLP): Wang et al. [25] 
proposed DLP, an alternative relay-based padding scheme. 
This scheme utilizes a combination of packet delays and 
dummy packets in order to obfuscate the timing patterns 
within packet flows. The delays are managed using a strict 
upper boundary to limit the length of the delays administered, 
similarly the insertion of dummy packets uses a minimum 
transmission rate [25]. Utilising packet delays alongside 
dummy packets remove timings more effectively than simply 
filling the gaps, making all flows over the network appear 
similar [25].  
3) Defensive Dropping (DD): DD differs from AP and 
DLP. Instead of injecting dummy packets by relays, the 
injection is performed by the client/initiator. The packets are 
administered at a constant rate across the network removing 
all identifiable timings. Additionally, the scheme features 
packet dropping to obfuscate the observed number of packets 
being transmitted, dummy packets are selected to be 
“dropped” by individual relays along the circuit. 
V. ANALYSIS  AND EVALUATION 
A. Entry Guard Selection and Rotation Updates 
 The updates to the algorithm provide protection against 4 
of the 5 studied timing/traffic correlation attacks, fulfilling 
goal 1.0. The countermeasure also fulfils goals 3.0 and 5.0, in 
that it requires no interaction from the user, nor configuration 
or knowledge in order to function. In addition, the refined 
load-balancing features of the algorithm ensure that there is no 
additional resource cost for the increased anonymity provided, 
each of these elements demonstrates good suitability for the 
design goals of the system. Despite refinement, it is of course 
still possible for an adversary to gain the entry guard position 
(with increased resource costs), this means it cannot fulfil goal 
4.0, this combined with the fact that it is not a goal of all 
attack variations means it is not sufficient on its own. There 
are all remaining open issues, such as the case where an 
attacker attempts to perform a denial-of-service on the single 
guard node?, how long before reverting back?, etc., and thus, 
does not yet meet goal 4.0 [18]. 
B. Multipath Routing Schemes – mTorHS and Conflux 
Multipath routing schemes offer the improved performance 
by load-balancing across the lesser used, lower bandwidth 
relays dynamically, and showing very good potential for 
withstanding the potential future increases in network load 
(meeting goal 4.0 and 5.0) [21], [22]. The flow splitting and 
merging properties result in the potential destruction of the 
packet transmission timings that many timing correlations and 
WPF attacks covered here exploit (meeting goal 1.0 and 
potentially 1.1 when configured aggressively). The scheme 
also distorts the packet ordering, making this a potential 
defence for 3/5 studied WPF attacks (mostly meeting goal 
2.0). Goal 3.0 can also be met by this measure, as long as the 
configuration is predefined, the standard user needs not to 
understand the system to still be effective. There are still open 
issues with the scheme, first, is the fact that it requires each 
end of the circuit (relays or clients depending on 
configuration) to be up to date for the flow splitting/merging 
to be applied. Also, multiple entry guards and exit 
configuration conflicts with the single-entry guard update. All 
of these aspects conflict with goal 6.0, suggesting the need for 
further research on how to deploy and manage the 
countermeasure.  
C. HTTPOS Randomised Pipelining 
Cai et al. [12] simulated their (and Panchenko et al.’s [11]) 
WPF attack, claiming the defence had little effect on the 
accuracy of these attacks. However, further research into this 
area revealed that a bugged version of the Tor browser was 
tested (suffering from a lack of randomisation) [20]. The 
measure has the potential to reduce the accuracy of all the 
WPF attacks covered (potentially satisfying goal 2.0), 
outlining the need for further research in order to establish 
whether the experimental measure is effective [24]. HTTPOS 
imposes little extra overhead, in keeping with the low-latency 
design of the system (satisfying goal 5.0). The countermeasure 
itself is part of the Tor Browser, defaulted to be activated, 
posing no compatibility issues, thus fulfilling goal 6.0. 
Unfortunately, in order for the countermeasure to work the 
web server being accessed must have the feature activated. 
Similarly, a malicious relay could deactivate the feature, this 
sensitivity conflicts with goal 4.0, and suggests the need for 
alternative measures that do not rely on certain conditions in 
order to be effective [24]. 
D. Improved Bandwidth Verification 
The bandwidth verification algorithm is a supporting 
defence for the entry guard selection updates, the measure 
raises the resource requirement to become a guard relay. The 
measure requires no configuration as it runs in the background 
periodically across the network (meeting goal 3.0), as the 
“bwauths” are external machines, there is no observable issue 
with compatibility allowing relays to operate within the 
network as normal (satisfying goal 6.0) [15]. Additionally, 
measurements are generally a small transfer to ensure that the 
relay is not unnecessarily loaded, satisfying goal 5.0 [15], 
[26]. Although the bandwidth authorities frustrate an 
adversary from influencing the relay bandwidth weighting 
selection algorithm, it is still not impossible to cheat the 
authorities. Thill [20] details a method to fool the authorities. 
This can be achieved due to the fact that the “bwauths” have 
publicly available IP addresses, allowing an adversary to 
dynamically assign bandwidth during measurements. Because 
of this, the countermeasure does not satisfy goal 4.0, 
suggesting the need for further refinement to ensure that an 
adversary cannot deploy a relay with the appearance of a high 
resource relay. 
E. Delay and Padding Schemes 
1) Adaptive Padding: AP provides some resistance to the 
traffic/timing correlation attacks. Similarly, resistance is also 
provided to 3 of 4 WPF attacks that rely on counting the 
number and timing of packets, due to the dummy packets 
inserted (thereby mostly meeting goal 1.0 and goal 2.0) [27]. 
Adaptive padding is primarily administered by relays and 
should not require any configuration or interaction from the 
user or the relay operator, thus mostly satisfying goal 3.0. 
Compared to the other techniques studied, AP incurs the least 
bandwidth and latency costs, ensuring that it is in meeting 
with goal 5.0 [28]. An issue with this scheme is the 
requirement for relays to administer the technique, requiring 
the relay to be up-to-date, otherwise padding will only be 
applied from the outgoing flow. This is not ideal as most WPF 
attacks rely on fingerprinting incoming packet flows. A lack 
of significant delay means that actively injected timing 
patterns still remain hidden within the dummy traffic. This 
allows an attacker to potentially reverse engineer the padding 
in order to find the injected timing pattern, because of these 
reasons it cannot be said to meet goal 4.0, and most likely 
requires further research in order to be implemented more 
effectively [27], [28], [25].  
2) Dependent Link Padding: DLP should prevent 4 of the 
studied timing correlation attacks and could potentially 
prevent 3 of the WPF attacks that rely on packet counting in 
order to correlate their fingerprints, making it the strongest 
studied padding scheme and thus meets goals 1.0, 1.1, 2.0 and 
2.1 [25], [6]. The technique requires no set-up from the user 
providing the strict delay bound is predefined (meeting goal 
3.0). The main downfall of this scheme is also the source of its 
strength, the volume of dummy traffic required to match the 
fastest traffic on the network, comes at a high bandwidth cost, 
conflicting with goals 4.0 and 5.0 [25], [6]. DLP is 
administered client-side, which means it does not rely on 
relays implementation of the measure to provide its benefits, 
nor would it stop the network functioning (meeting goal 6.0). 
However, this design has an issue, web servers or hidden 
services must administer the feature to ensure that return 
traffic is padded. This is not desired, especially, as WPF 
attacks focus on incoming traffic. The combination of these 
downfalls and conflicts illustrate that it is unsuitable for use on 
the Tor network, which aims at providing a usable and low 
latency service. 
3) Defensive Dropping: DD is the final padding technique 
under evaluation, much like dependent link padding defensive 
dropping is administered by the client and relays 
independently. This means that a client can utilise its benefits 
immediately upon their outgoing traffic, satisfying goal 6.0. 
However, for the returned traffic to be padded, the relay must 
have the measure implemented for the benefits to be delivered 
to inbound traffic. In addition, these relays will not drop the 
dummy packets and continue to forward them introducing 
some excess traffic to the network, which is in conflict with 
goals 4.0 and 5.0. The countermeasure removes both natural 
and injected timing characteristics, thereby protecting against 
timing based correlation and WPF attacks (4/5, mostly 
meeting goal 1.0), the dropping of dummy packets also alters 
the number of packets that can be observed during 
transmission, thereby frustrating packet counting-based WPF 
attacks (satisfying goal 2.0). 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 This study establishes that the updated guard selection and 
rotation algorithm is a great improvement upon the original, 
increasing the resources required for an adversary relay to 
gain the guard status. However, the remaining open questions 
behind a single guard suggest the need for further research in 
this field. HTTPOS pipelining showed much promise with the 
updates to randomization, but a lack of literature utilising the 
updated version means that its effectiveness is inconclusive. 
Thus, it requires further research in order to perform a more 
conclusive evaluation of the measure. The bandwidth probing 
improvements supersede previously unverified 
implementation, further increasing the resource requirements. 
Unfortunately, these authorities can still be fooled, albeit still 
requiring good burst bandwidth in order to influence the 
bandwidth weights. Multipath routing schemes offered great 
improvements to load-balancing and performance, meeting the 
design goals of the system. Unfortunately, due to the unclear 
deployment, further research in this field would be required. 
This is particularly true in case of its conflicts with the use of 
single entry guard relay. A variety of padding based schemes 
were analysed, finding that they generally pose excessive 
overheads in order to provide strong protection, the two most 
suited schemes are Adaptive Link Padding and Defensive 
Dropping. The common theme with these schemes was the 
requirement of relay co-operation for the protection to be 
provided in both traffic directions. 
Future work in this area would benefit from testing the 
countermeasures, upon the system in its current state, as it was 
found much of the literature was based around previous 
versions of Tor (HTTPOS in particular). Simulating the 
studied attacks on the current system would enable a more 
thorough evaluation of their effectiveness and performance 
under different conditions. The research, however, outlined 
the potential of multipath routing schemes, enabling better 
utilization of the bandwidth being offered by smaller 
contributors to the network. The increased diversification of 
the relays used could potentially increase the strength of 
anonymity provided, as well as provide performance benefits. 
The main issue outlined with this proposal was the unclear 
deployment and management of the concept, potentially 
requiring network-wide co-operation in order for the measure 
to be applied. Furthermore, the multipath conflicts with a 
single guard suggest that the research around the guard 
selection algorithm should be performed in collaboration with 
such a scheme in order to address the conflicts in deployment. 
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